Organic agriculture and food security: are they mutually dependent? The case of Cuba

Julia Wright

Abstract

In the early 1990s, industrialised Cuba was faced with a critical situation: its foreign supplies of agricultural inputs and food imports were permanently cut off. There was no other option but to become more self sufficient and to turn to alternative agricultural systems. By the end of the decade, it appeared that Cuba had not only managed to feed all its population and increase production, but also to be operating production along organic lines. This research analyses the extent of this change, based on extensive field work in Cuba between 1999-2001. Is rural Cuba really organic, and can it really feed its population in this manner? If not, then why not � what were the challenges it faced? Understanding the Cuban experience is essential for countries which are still unable to provide national security of food, as well as for all those industrialised countries whose agricultural systems are dependent on fossil fuels.

Introduction

Cuba was in a unique situation: since 1959 it had developed a highly mechanised, high-input agriculture operating through large State run farms, and producing mainly export products - sugar, tobacco and citrus fruits � which it sold at preferential prices to the USSR in return for cheap fuel, agricultural inputs and major foodstuffs. In 1989 the Soviet Block collapsed, and with this went the inputs that Cuba had relied upon � petrol, machinery, chemical fertilisers and pesticides. The availability of pesticides and fertilisers fell by 80%. Fossil fuels dropped by 65%, and food imports by over 50%. State subsidies to farming halved. Agricultural production and food availability fell overnight, with average calorific intake dropping by as much as 30% compared to levels in the 1980s.

Reports coming out of Cuba throughout the 1990s told of a resounding success story of an organic agricultural model on a national scale (for example, Levins, 1990; Altieri, 1993; Rosset & Cunningham, 1994; Wilson & Harris 1996; Weaver, 1997; Ritchie, 1998; Bourque, 1999). B y 1997, yields of the majority of basic field crops were higher than previous averages of the 1980s, and especially of roots, tubers and fresh vegetables. It was not only agricultural production which had apparently transformed. According to reports, the Cuban government had successfully managed to uphold its socialist principles in terms of food security, through an explicit policy to feed its people.

Cuba is interesting because it had to reorientate its agricultural system to become more self sufficient under low external input conditions, and at the same time its food system under low fuel conditions. Given the longstanding global rhetoric to develop a more sustainable, environmentally friendly, less chemically-dependent agriculture, and the concern that using up fossil fuel reserves within the next two decades may require the strict regulation of petrol and petroleum based products as well as the development of alternatives, there has been surprisingly little proactive, concerted interest in the Cuban experience by the formal agricultural research, development or policy community.

Methododology

Commencing in 1998 and initially funded by the European Commission, this research was undertaken out of the Social Sciences Department of Wageningen University, the Netherlands. Field work was undertaken between 1999-2001, based at the Instituto de Ciencias Agricolas (INCA), Havana. Research questions were addressed through analyses of maize seed and cropping systems in Havana Province, the determinants of farming strategies over three provinces (Havana, Cienfuegos and Holguin), food system transformation, and the institutionalisation of the Cuban organic movement. The main tools used were semi-structured interviews and checklists of questions, for quantitative and qualitative analyses. Interviews took place with over 350 farmers, research and extension workers, and Ministry staff from the sectors of Agriculture, Education, Environment and Health.

Selected Results

Is Cuba organic?

Cuba was not farming with an organic approach. Field results indicated that 75% of farmers were using synthetic fertilisers, and 65% were using synthetic pesticides. The majority of farmers want to use more of these inputs as they become available. In terms of transition, the majority of the country is at a stage of substitution of synthetics for biological inputs. However, in terms of intensiveness, there is a distinct patchwork effect throughout the country. Certain crops are allocated higher levels of inputs, whilst others receive none, and this varies by province and municipality. Certain types of farming cooperative use more ecological approaches than others, and this is also true for individual farmers some of whom are more innovative than others. The same goes for the Ministry, for research and extension groups and individuals. The claim to organic really attributes to the urban farming sector which does operate largely along organic lines and is strongly supported by government policy and research. So why is urban agriculture different? Because it grew spontaneously as the State allowed individuals to farm on any piece of land available; because it is small scale and manageable, because agrochemicals were accepted early on as being unhealthy for use in an urban environment, and because urban agriculture has been able to prove its worth in a relatively short period of time. Rural production, on the other hand, had a history of embeddedness in industrialised thinking and farming systems, and this takes longer to change, as almost all Cubans interviewed conferred.

Yet both research results and farming practice show that widespread organic production is technically feasible and would provide sustainable yields, often surpassing yields of industrialised production. The main restrictions to the increased uptake of organic techniques were identified as: lack of access to organic inputs and lack of access to knowledge on organic agriculture. Educators of agroecology in Cuba identified the main long term challenge of changing the dominant industrialised mentality at all levels from farm to policy.

Is Cuba feeding its population?

Although national food production levels are steadily increasing, Cuba remains dependent on both food imports and food aid, and wastage remains a problem in the distribution system. Human health problems are increasing, with over-consumption leading to an all-time high for overweight and obesity rates of 36.5% by the late 1990s (obesity had dropped to 16% in 1993) and heart disease is the main cause of death. Yet throughout, Cuba has managed to maintain basic daily access to food by each citizen in the country, even during its most desperate years of the early 1990s, a feat not achieved by other food insecure countries. Its success in turning the situation around to attain an equitable level of food security over the decade of the 1990s is contributable to several factors.

Factor 1 : A cohesive cross-sectoral policy (political will). Underlying Cuba's success has been the long term political interest in providing basic social needs: education , electricity, roads, and housing, and a basic food ration. Thus during this crisis, the ability was maintained for subsistence occupations to continue and especially of agriculture. Political will also meant joined-up action, with a self-imposed state of emergency during which time the population accepted sacrifices in living standards in order to build up levels of self sufficiency. A three pronged national strategy for food security emerged: the improvement of an early warning monitoring system, the encouragement of domestic food production, and the continued guaranteed access by all to the food available. All agricultural institutions refocused to place food security as their top strategic priority throughout the decade.

Factor 2 : Ensuring access - equitable distribution and social safety nets. For Cuba, this meant maintaining a basic food ration to each citizen in the country, which it managed to provide even in the most desperate years of the early 1990s. To support the ration, farmers were obliged to sell a certain quantity of their planned production to the State at an agreed, if low, price. The State also encouraged diversification of unsubsidised food sources for the population, as well as employment opportunities.

Factor 3 : Promotion of domestic food production.

Input substitution . To replace the shortfall of imported agricultural inputs, 220 small laboratories and production centres were constructed nationwide, for the production of biological control agents, biological pesticides and biofertilisers. This substitution of inputs has meant that, to some extent, the sector has been able to adapt rapidly without having to massively re-educate the farming sector. Recourse was also made to traditional crop husbandry practices such as intercropping, green manuring, rotations and crop-livestock interactions. Farms were also encouraged to diversify their production with a priority for local self-sufficiency.

Increased land access . In September 1993, a law was passed to allow for small farmers and cooperatives to receive more land free and in perpetuity if they dedicated it mainly to the production of certain crops. Further land � approximately 1/4 ha - could be given to individuals and pensioners interested in family self-provisioning. The general population was urged to participate through community and family home gardens or community tree planting, and also encouraged was food production in the workplace, and production by other government sectors such as the military.

Farm reorganisation . The State acknowledged that small, private producers had been more productive than the large state farms. Therefore the State farms were broken down and put into cooperative ownership. In 1992, 75% of cultivable land was in the hands of State farms, but by 1997 this figure had dropped to 34%. Within a cooperative, an individual or group could be bound to a piece of land and responsible for its production, and as an incentive receive a share of any surplus production. Conversely, a share could be deducted from the wage packet if production plans were not fulfilled. This was called �Linking man to the land'.

Factor 4 : Investment in extension and training. Training in all aspects of more efficient farm management was run at several levels � for farmers, technical staff and farm administrators - and in all areas of the country, including through long distance diploma and postgraduate courses. This training included ecological production principles and techniques. Extension services were expanded, each farm cooperative having a resident facilitator.

Factor 5 : Increased farmer incentives. On state farms, the basic workers' salary was increased, and both state and private farms benefited from more diversified and higher priced agricultural markets. Farm gate prices rose by 50%. Migration to rural areas was incentivised through a regeneration programme called �The Dignity of Farming Life'. Access to credit improved. Farming is currently one of the highest paid professions in Cuba and the State has no more need to encourage migration.

Factor 6 : Increased post-harvest efficiency. In 1993, a new food procurement process was introduced, with farmers bringing their produce to multiple rural collection points at a pre-arranged day and time, where they would hand over to the State buyers and receive payment on the spot. With a priority on reducing postharvest losses, local processing plants were installed, and adequate labour organised for peak harvesting periods. By the end of the decade, most provinces were self sufficient in the basic staples and seasonally in vegetables and fruits, and an increase in local and regional production-consumption linkages.

Factor 7 : Selectivity over imports. Overall there was a priority at farm and regional levels to produce for the national population rather than for export; partly it was considered immoral to do otherwise, but also Cubans were aware of their lack of competitive know-how, technology and organisation. Decisions over which foods to import were made pragmatically, with different rules applying to different crops. Certain perishable foods would be too expensive to be produced and stored in Cuba, and certain staples could not yet be guaranteed year round through national production.

Challenges to a more sustainable agriculture

The overall limiting factor to improving any kind of agricultural practice was the lack of fuel, as farmers had been dependent on receiving, or travelling to collect, external inputs and information. In addition, irrigation pumps were commonly petrol-driven. As long as the farming sector did not attempt to develop semi-closed systems, this limitation would remain. Several specific challenges also stood out: the lack of political commitment for organic agriculture driven by a drive to maximise production, a lack of organic inputs and relevant knowledge, the presence of myths and misperceptions surrounding organic agriculture, a general reticence to change, and underlying fears over the implications of working with, rather than against, nature, and over deficiencies of both inputs and food.

Conclusions

Four conclusions emerge out of the case of Cuba. First, nationwide food security is achievable with political (institutional) will and its comprehensive implementation. Second, the removal of agrochemicals (and agribusiness) does not signify that production is organic; converting to organic requires a conscious decision to do so, and the Cuban government has not yet shown this political will. Third, yet, organic agriculture is technically feasible, and economically viable, as a mainstream component of a nation's food security strategy. Fourth, without a more holistic agricultural strategy, human and environmental health-related production problems will persist.

Cuba may be unique in its governance, but not dissimilar to capitalist countries if we compare with the extent of corporate centralisation and control. In fact, while western farming and food systems have become increasingly mechanised, uniform and totalitarian, Cuba, in the 1990s, has been moving toward greater complexity, diversity, human-scale and bioregional production.

Julia Wright, International Development Programme, HDRA (Henry Doubleday Research Association), Ryton Organic Gardens, Coventry CV8 3LG, UK. Tel. 00 44 (0) 24 7630 8235; E-mail: [email protected] ; Internet www.hdra.org.uk